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ABSTRACT 
The role of technology in modern society is becoming fundamental to society itself as the 
boundary between technological utilization and technological interference narrows. 
Technology penetrates the core of an ever-increasing number of application domains. It 
exerts considerable influence over institutions, often in subtle ways that cannot be fully 
understood, and the effects of which, cannot be easily demarcated. Also, the ever-
expanding ecosystem of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) results in 
an emergent complexity with unpredictable consequences. Over the past decades this has 
created a tension that has led to a heated debate concerning the relationship between the 
technical and the social. Some theorists subsume the technical into the social, others 
proclaim its domination, others its autonomy, while yet others suggest that it is a 
derivative of the social. Starting with Luhmann’s remark that technology determines what 
we observe and what we do not observe, this paper takes the approach that infers there 
are multiple benefits by looking into how Systems Theory can provide a coherent 
theoretical platform upon which these interactions can be further explored. It provides a 
theoretical treatise that examines the conditions through which the systemic nature of 
technology can be inspected. Also, the paper raises a series of questions that probe the 
nature of technological interference in other ‘function-systems’ of society (such as the 
economy, science, politics, etc). To achieve this goal, a 2nd order cybernetics approach is 
employed (mostly influenced by the works of Niklas Luhmann), in order to both 
investigate and delineate the impact of technology as system. Toward that end, a variety 
of influences of Information Systems (IS) are used as examples, opening the door to a 
complexity that emerges out of the interaction of technology with its socio-economic and 
political context. The paper describes technology as an observing system within the 
context of 2nd order cybernetics, and looks into what could be the different possibilities 
for a binary code for that system. Finally, the paper presents a framework that synthesizes 
relevant systems theoretical concepts in the context of the systemic character of 
technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Technology is, without doubt, a dominant influence on modern society. Unfortunately, 
despite this, we usually insist on treating technology as if it is a multi-purpose ‘tool’ that 
can be simply implemented in different domains of society. This attitude, usually 
accompanied by the delusion that technology solves problems, ignores the more serious 
effects that technology inflicts on other societal subsystems (Angell, 1993). While there 
is no denying the positive side of technology, or the negative for that matter, the second 
order effects are usually ignored because of an unshakeable belief in the largely 
controllable instrumentality with which technology can be deployed (Angell & Demetis, 
2010). This paper argues for the need to develop a systemic description of technology 
that revolves around its autonomous character. 
In order to consider the forcefulness with which technology has come to occupy an ever-
larger number of societal subsystems, an appropriate theoretical language is needed to 
describe the notable changes that technology creates. This remains a difficult task for a 
number of interconnected reasons. First, technological implementations exhibit 
considerable variety, and therefore, to be all-inclusive any theoretical treatise that sets out 
to describe the role of technology, will have to deploy a highly abstract lexicon to 
describe different contingencies. Second, the description of the role of technology within 
society remains a complex endeavor (Kallinikos, 2002). To attempt a coherent 
description of that role means to ponder the ‘character’ of technology itself. More 
importantly, it means being able to describe the mechanism with which technological 
interference is manifested. Third, while some scholars have attempted to portray 
technology as occupying a distinct role within modern life, thereby granting it some 
degree of autonomy, these approaches usually fail to deliver the more subtle 
technological interference that propagates across the boundaries of other systems 
(Demetis, 2010). So there is a need to be able to describe the foundation of any systemic 
interactivity between technology and other societal systems. 
Of course, for systems theorists, all these aspects are not an issue, in the sense that they 
are all characteristics of what they could broadly call a system. Needless to say, systems 
theory is a significant candidate for the role, as it is no stranger to multidisciplinary 
analysis (in fact it has always pursued it). Furthermore, with second-order cybernetics 
applied to society (arguably one of the very latest steps in the long line of advancing 
systems theoretical concepts), the lexicon of systems theory itself has advanced, albeit 
with its description of social systems gaining in complexity (Luhmann, 1993, 1995, 
2002b). With this development, there is opportunity not only to describe complex social 
systems, but also to show how other systems (such as technology) interact with society. 
In this paper, I argue that we need a systems theory for technology, built on the tradition 
of social second-order cybernetics, so that we can develop an ability to describe the 
mechanism through which technology has discernible but non-causal effects in society 
(in the sense technology’s effects cannot be attributed to specific causes). In other words, 
we need to be able to describe technology as system (or to be more specific, as a 
functionally differentiated system within society). Ironically, despite all the signs that 
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modern technology is becoming indispensable, this endeavor is almost non-existent even 
within the discipline of Information Systems (Lee, 2010), where applications of systems 
theory are extremely scarce. It is important to consider the systemic fabric of technology 
because the effects of technology are not restricted to just the strict confines of the 
domains within which technological implementations can be found. Instead, technology 
interferes in a profound way with other core functions systems across society, like the 
economic, the political, or the legal systems. On a number of occasions, this interference 
distorts the very function of these systems, which are supposedly adopting technology to 
serve their own purposes. By extension, unpredictable consequences cannot be restricted 
solely to those systems themselves, but have knock-on effects for society at large. 
This paper is structured as follows: First, there is a review of the functional 
differentiation of society, and the role of technology reflected in it; second, Niklas 
Luhmann’s perspective on technology is discussed through his concepts of ‘functioning 
simplification’ and ‘closure’; third, a theoretical model is developed in order to 
consolidate some observations and reflect on their interactions. Of course, the description 
of technology as a system through second-order cybernetics must be viewed as a 
substantial research programme. This paper is a small step towards an initial theoretical 
framework, at the same time recognizing the limitations of doing so in this form. 
 
THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY AND THE ROLE OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
Even if we are to describe technology as a system in its own right, we need to accept that 
no system exists in a void. Technology can be perceived as structurally coupled with 
other systems, with their co-evolution exceeding any conventional descriptions of cause-
and-effect. In order to establish some ground upon which technology can be perceived as 
maintaining a systemic hypostasis, it is critical that we look into the functional 
differentiation of society (Luhmann, 1995; Moeller, 2006). This will be helpful in order 
to examine the functional differentiation of technology itself. 
The functional differentiation of society into subsystems is informed by four essential 
assumptions: 
i) the functions that characterise the subsystems of society (e.g. law, economy religion, 
science, etc), are constitutive of a subsystem’s internal operations. Functions are different 
from hierarchies in that functions always synthesise a multitude of possibilities within the 
subsystems, and become an alternative form for expressing unity and difference. 
ii) Within Niklas Luhmann’s description of social systems (Luhmann, 1995), the system 
of society is considered to be the predominant system to which all others refer; only the 
system of society is operationally closed, by the function of communication that is central 
for any societal aspect. 
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iii) Differentiations within society are those that give rise to the constitution of 
subsystems within it (what we would call function-systems). The autopoiesis of the 
subsystems is intertwined with, and supported by, communication. Without 
communication, it becomes impossible to achieve any coordination of the subsystems’ 
elements against positive (that is destabilizing) feedback generated by the environment. 
The centrality of communication in this regard, elevates the informational value of 
communication as a shield against what would ultimately threaten a system’s survival. 
Also, communication transcends the boundaries of different subsystems of society such 
as the political, the legal, or the economic systems. 
iv) Autopoiesis then becomes a critical characteristic within the functional differentiation 
of society into subsystems. Without autopoiesis the subsystems lose their ability to ‘re-
make themselves’ and reconstitute their elements (Von Foerster, Zopf, & United States. 
Office of Naval Research., 1962), as they face the ambiguities of the environment with 
which they are coupled. Autopoietic systems are operationally closed, and in this sense 
they are autonomous systems (Luhmann 2005). In this sense, a system cannot be more or 
less autopoietic; but it can be more or less complex. Thus the distinction between 
open/closed systems becomes obsolete; it is replaced by the question of ‘how self-
referential closure can create openness’ (ibid). 
With these initial comments regarding the functional differentiation of society into 
different subsystems, one can proceed by consolidating these above aspects in a 
definition for such a differentiation. According to Luhmann, 
“ ‘Differentiation’ means the emergence of a particular subsystem of society by which 
the characteristics of system formation, especially autopoietic self-reproduction, self-
organization, structural determination and, along with all these, operational closure itself 
are realized” (Luhmann, 2000). 
Perhaps the most critical aspect in differentiation that needs to be emphasised here is the 
unique directionality with which it occurs. Differentiation of society into subsystems is 
not a process that is imposed top down. On the contrary, it is spawned by particular 
inventions that generate the differentiation, and hence make the constitution of 
subsystems necessary. In other words, such inventions spawn the conditions for the 
emergence of subsystems that the rest of society cannot subsume, eliminate, or ignore. In 
fact, the only thing that a society can do in the face of such powerful inventions is attempt 
to regulate the effects these subsystems will have, and develop strategies for handling 
their destabilising effects. In this manner, function-systems assimilate critical advances 
and inventions. They become resilient and indispensable for society, but at the same time, 
they open the door for an ever expanding complexity within themselves, which feeds 
back to other function-systems in unexpected ways. 
Then, one can observe that, 
“Unlike in the ancient European description of society, such as Plato’s theory of the 
politically ordered society (politeia, republic), this does not happen in the form of the 
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division of a whole on the basis of essential differences between the parts. Indeed, 
differentiations in social evolution do not arise in this way, from above, as it were, but 
rather on the basis of very specific evolutionary achievements, such as the invention of 
coins, resulting in the differentiation of an economic system, or the invention of the 
concentration of power in political offices, resulting in the differentiation of a political 
system. In other words, what is needed is a productive differentiation which, in 
favourable conditions, leads to the emergence of systems to which the rest of society can 
only adapt” (ibid). 
Within Luhmann’s description of functional differentiation of society, the question that 
arises almost immediately is how ‘technology as a system’ can be viewed within society 
(Demetis, 2010). One can begin to suspect that technology is related to the system of 
science and can be described as just another subsystem within the system of science. But 
the system of science can also be viewed as the platform that delivered a series of 
technology-related inventions. On the basis of bottom-to-top productive differentiations, 
it could be said that a series of inventions, most notably the Integrated Circuit 
(microchip), have led to the development and evolution of computing, thereby creating 
those favourable and necessary conditions for the differentiation of the system of 
(information) technology. With the evolution in computation, and more importantly, the 
invention of the Internet and the World Wide Web, the black-boxes of isolated computing 
devices have mutated into the elements of a very complex and resilient network 
(Dertouzos, 1997). However, they are not independent of the users and the society around 
them. This has created a new complex system that also has communication at its very 
core. Effectively it has created a 2nd order society, or a meta-society where 
communication becomes computationally structured, and where the exchange of 
positive/negative feedback becomes contingent on how data are being manipulated (e.g. 
through techniques like profiling, data mining, and so on). This creates a structural 
coupling between society and the computationally structured 2nd order society, with 
effects that dynamically affect both. This transition in computation and the creation of a 
2nd order society needs to be highlighted repeatedly; because it is through this transition 
that modern technology re-structures the communication that is required for the new 
system itself. Even more importantly, the transition into modern technology sets new 
conditions and limitations for the operational closure of society. Ultimately, 
communication is the common factor of both society and technology in a similar (but 
different) type of operative closure. 
The concept of communication in this context cannot be stressed enough. As Luhmann 
remarks, “the concept of communication can be built into a theory of complex systems 
only if one gives up the long-established idea that systems exist as elements and relations 
among these elements. It is replaced by the thesis that, because of complexity, carrying 
out the process of relating elements requires selections, and thus relationship cannot be 
simply added onto the elements. With those selections, the process of relating qualifies 
elements by cutting off some of their possibilities. In other words, the system contains, as 
complexity, a surplus of possibilities, which it self-selectively reduces.” (Luhmann, 
1995). In this mode, communication means limitation. More crucially, technology then 
can be perceived to pose an additional limitation into the stream of societal 
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communication itself. Under the aegis of technology, the process of relating elements and 
establishing connections between them is realized through automation. Algorithms are 
the carriers of the logic that constructs these relations. However, this comes at a price of 
creating further observable/unobservable distinctions that are streamlined into 
technology. How else could an algorithm even work, if not by determining what is to be 
automated and what is to be left unautomated as a prerequisite for automation? 
Now, if technology is to be treated as a system, then what would be required in order to 
establish its systemic identity? A ‘hard-line approach’ would be to acknowledge that 
defining any system is an observer-relative act. So anything can be a system. However, in 
the context of the subsystems of society, what we could label as function systems, are 
established upon firm binary codes. While binary codes (the distinction-making identities 
of systems) are well known in the systems community, it is still useful to reflect on 
coding from a second-order cybernetics perspective and stress the importance of the 
observer. 
CODING 
In the context of the functional differentiation of society, technology can only be 
characterised as a system if the conditions discussed previously are fulfilled. However, 
how systemic differentiation are carried out, also implies an observer-relative 
positioning; ultimately, that remains an act of choice. Nevertheless, whether and to what 
extent different observers perceive, construct, and analyse a different technological 
system is one thing; but to deny the presuppositions that give rise to the system of 
technology itself, including the consequences of specific bottom-to-top inventions that 
led to advances in computing and networking, underestimates the implications of these 
phenomena. 
Consider the political system, which refers to its own operations, and hence is able to 
refer to its elements for the constitution of any subsystem within it. In this manner, it is 
self-referential, as are the legal and economic systems (Luhmann, 2004). By the ability of 
all these systems to refer to themselves (the primary concept of self-reference), they gain 
the capacity to carry out internal differentiations, and hence allow for the creation of 
other systems within themselves (Luhmann, 1990). Self-reference implies that an 
emergent system acquires the property of self-reference out of the systems that 
communicate for the act of its systemic formation. This autopoietic transcendence from 
systems to systems implies that the code of a system solidifies the autonomy of a 
subsystem within a function-system (Demetis, 2010). This is certainly the case for what 
Luhmann calls ‘high technology’ (Luhmann, 1993) where the boundaries of the 
‘technical regulation of technology’ are transcended. Technology ‘controlling’ other 
technology is nothing new as a concept, however, the regulative character of this 
association exhibits self-organization. 
With the hope of not stating the obvious, the issue of ‘coding’ has got absolutely nothing 
to do with computer coding. As it has already been discussed, in the systems community, 
the ideas represented in the concept of ‘codes’ or ‘binaries’ are well known, however, it 
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is still useful to view the function of coding in the context of second order cybernetics. A 
code within a system has a primary utility: communication. Communication takes two 
distinct forms based on the codes: the code serves (1) to communicate the function of the 
system amongst its subsystems, and (2) to ensure that there is something that constitutes 
the fundamental difference being communicated between subsystems. Regardless of the 
variety or complexity that subsystems may exhibit, they always have to refer to the code 
in one way or another (ibid). An example might help in clarifying this issue. 
For instance, the code of the legal system is determined by the distinction of legal/illegal 
(Luhmann, 2004). The code can only be established as the unity of the distinction being 
systemically used in order to communicate the system’s goals throughout all of its 
subsystems and as a reference point to itself. This means that whatever subsystems may 
exist within the system of law – functionally differentiated from society –, such 
subsystems always communicate within the constraints of, and by the use of, the 
fundamental distinction between legal/illegal. 
This distinction between legal/illegal that serves as the code of the legal system has 
considerable systemic implications, because ‘while the distinction between legal and 
illegal can be maintained for individual coding, the system as a unity can never decide the 
basis of what is legal or illegal. It can never apply the code to itself as a system. There is 
no foundational value establishing what is legal or illegal, only operations’ (Luhmann 
2004). Therefore the code itself is foundational in system formations that are 
functionally-differentiated from society. As the code in itself characterises the primary 
function of differentiation of the system, it is impossible for the system to use the code to 
describe itself. This means for example that the distinction being used ‘enables the legal 
system to operate legally (!) by declaring that something is legal or against the law’ 
(Luhmann 2000). The code exposed in this way becomes the first expression of self-
reference within the system, and also the foundational representation of all autopoietic 
functioning without which the legal system would not be able to sustain itself, let alone 
become differentiated.Within five major functionally-differentiated systems of society, 
the code in respect to each system is portrayed in the table below (Moeller, 2006): 
TABLE 1 
System Code 
Law Legal/Illegal 
Politics Government/Opposition 
Science True/False 
Religion Immanence/Transcendence 
Economy Payment/Non-Payment 
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CODES AND SYSTEMS: FUNDAMENTAL UNITIES OF DISTINCTIONS 
The fact that the code cannot be applied by the system to itself is something that should 
place the concept of the code at the centrepiece of systemic formation (the act of 
formation of any system designated by an observer). If the system was able to apply the 
code that is constitutive of the system’s differentiation, then that would mean that the 
system would be able to describe itself fully. However, that possibility of a system 
describing itself fully can only arise if the system uses its whole self for the description. 
That is tautological. It creates an entity with no connecting value, an entity that cannot be 
connected to any other. In recognising the importance of this problem, Luhmann remarks 
the following: 
“If one tries to observe both sides of the distinction one uses at the same time, one sees a 
paradox – that is to say, an entity without connective value. The different is the same, the 
same is different. So what? First of all, this means that all knowledge and all action have 
to be founded on paradoxes and not on principles; on the self-referential unity of the 
positive and the negative – that is, on an ontologically unqualifiable world. And if one 
splits the world into two marked and unmarked parts to be able to observe something, its 
unity becomes unobservable. The paradox is the visible indicator of invisibility. And 
since it represents the unity of the distinction required for the operation called 
observation, the operation itself remains invisible” (Luhmann 2002). 
This makes the point of the primacy of a code for a function-system even more crucial. 
The code is not only a necessary paradox that cannot resolve itself (in being utilised by 
the system that incorporates it), but also a foundational aspect of the constitution of any 
system of knowledge and all action. Without this necessary initial asymmetry exposed by 
the fact that the code cannot be defined by the system, an asymmetry that takes the form 
of a paradox, the system would not have been able to expand itself or even communicate 
within its internal differentiations. The asymmetry induced by the introduction of the 
code within a system is a necessary prerequisite for the evolutionary steps the system will 
take in re-defining itself and exploiting its environment. In other words, asymmetry 
becomes a necessary pre-requisite for self-reference, and for autopoiesis. The very fact 
that asymmetry is a foundational prerequisite for self-reference places asymmetry at the 
very core of scientific evolution, and even more so, infers that approximation is an 
unavoidable consequence of this asymmetry. 
The second most important role that the code helps to establish is that of communication 
between subsystems within the system. But that is not the only form of communication 
possible. The system, and any system, also communicates with its environment. If we 
again take the legal system as an example, then it becomes obvious that the legal system 
functionally differentiates itself from other systems in society by referring to its code 
(legal/non-legal). Systemic interpenetration requires that the legal system influences other 
functionally-differentiated systems of society (such as the economy) by ‘transmitting’ its 
code. The way in which this happens is through the depiction of the code into an instance 
of a notational schema that constitutes the means of communication, typically in the form 
of legal documents, articles, etc. 
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But even within the legal system, the code serves as a mode of communication between 
subsystems of the system itself. If we take the legal system as a whole then it becomes 
obvious that the subsystems within it also utilise the code legal/illegal, as a means of both 
establishing and perceiving themselves as subsystems of the legal system (say a law 
firm). In this way subsystems become autopoietic, and they also gain the means of 
communicating with both similar (i.e. other law firms) and different subsystems (e.g. a 
notary) within the system. The code of any system therefore plays a critical role. 
Regardless of how one may carry out internal differentiations within the legal system and 
hence attempt different subsystemic observations and interactions, the code remains 
primary to the concept of system and of any communication within that system. The code 
is what penetrates all subsystems within a functionally differentiated system, and is what 
ties together function, differentiation and autopoiesis of the system itself. 
THE CODE OF THE SYSTEM OF TECHNOLOGY 
In considering technology as a system within the realm of the structural yet constitutional 
differentiation between system and environment, a set of issues arises almost 
immediately. If technology is a system, then what is its environment? If technology is 
treated as a system within the schema of the functional differentiation of society, having 
emerged in a bottom-to-top fashion from particular scientific breakthroughs (like the 
invention of the microchip), then in the environment of technology as a system would be 
other function-systems like the legal system, the financial system, and the political 
system. But in such a scenario, wouldn’t technology refer to those systems (say a 
computer-based system designed to operate for the financial system), and hence collapse 
to a subordinate form that loses much of its distinctive character? The answer to this 
question is no for a series of reasons. Technology resists much of its subordination by 
maintaining systemic characteristics. Also, the volume of data that is subjected to 
automation implies that there is a complexity that is chaotic (in the sense that it cannot be 
pre-ordered) - it can be streamlined through technology so that it can become automated, 
but this affects considerably the way data is being generated by users as they become 
subjected to technology’s categorical assumptions. Of course the systemic aspect of 
complexity analysed in systems theory could be alluded to here, or indeed, the law of 
unintended consequences that stems from such a complexity. But there is something 
more to the phenomena that technology helps generate. 
Interpenetration of other systems with the system of technology implies a fundamental 
consideration that should not be underestimated. It implies that technology – with its 
distinctive character – counteracts top-to-bottom processes of other systems that attempt 
to employ technology as form by generating bottom-to-top processes that display a 
unique set of properties and that elevate technology from form to system. The concept of 
form in this regard implies a subordination and control of technology by individuals and 
organisations that adopt technology for application in a particular problem domain. 
Luhmann calls this ‘technicalizing the operations of (other) systems’. In contradistinction 
to the concept of form, the concept of system, when referring to technology, implies that 
technology retains all of its systemic attributes regardless of the problem domain with 
which it might be structurally coupled. But what makes current beliefs mostly reduce this 
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differentiation regarding technology as form, and what is to be gained in examining the 
underlying processes that restructure this difference? 
In order to remain true to the core principles of 2nd order cybernetics, the issues of 
observation and system (whether a function-system or not) need to be treated as 
intrinsically related (Scott, 2004; Winter & Thurm, 2005). The constitution of any system 
must be, above all, an observer-relative act. Function-systems may of course be separated 
on the basis of purely analytical targets, but this in itself constitutes a form of 
simplification at the core of function-systems themselves; a paradox coming from an 
observational simplification that makes observation possible in the first instance. The 
possibility for an artificial differentiation and separation of function-systems is somewhat 
countered by the concept of interpenetration and observation. This affects not only the 
systemic character of technology, but also its code. 
To start with, technology can be considered to be an observing system itself. The 
complexity of interrelated computing operations, even if designed by humans, cannot be 
broken down into their constituent components, nor can their effects in society be clearly 
delineated. At the level of the system, complexity shields the system itself from analytical 
simplification that would reduce its hypostasis at a mundane operational level. In other 
words, complexity shields the system from providing an accurate description of itself. 
Clearly, the broader effects that technology is inducing onto different social subsystems, 
portray a somewhat different picture from the concept of a neat-controllable 
technological installation. 
One possibility for the code of the function-system of technology could be found within 
the unity of the distinction between automation/non-automation. Through that distinction, 
technology can be perceived to determine ‘what we observe and what we do not observe; 
and it also controls which causes and effects are attributed to one another and which not’. 
The distinction then between observable/unobservable can become structurally coupled 
with the distinction of automation/non-automation. 
The following core considerations about technology can help us create a framework for 
the mechanism with which technology interferes with other functionally-differentiated 
systems, and how it gains its own systemic character. The reader is encouraged to look 
further into Luhmann (1993) where ‘The Special Case of High Technology’ is analysed 
from a risk perspective and where further valuable insights (or even mechanisms for 
technological interference) can be considered. By taking these observations into account, 
technology can be portrayed as: 
i) a functioning simplification in the medium of causality. Functioning simplification is a 
term that implies a reduction of an initial complexity that is subsequently streamlined 
within the realm of computer-based technologies. 
ii) an enabler of strict couplings. Technology simplifies complexity by insulating a 
stream of causal relations so that: a) processes may become controllable, b) resources can 
be planned, c) faults can be attributed. 
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iii) an enabler of the extensive causal closure of an operational area. Closure implies ‘the 
construction of a kind of protective cocoon that is placed around the selected causal 
sequences or processes to safeguard undesired interference and ensure their repeatable 
and reliable operation’ (Kallinikos, 2006). 
But to what extent does functioning simplification and closure accurately describe the 
Geist of technology (ibid)? Here, we must consider that functioning simplification and 
closure only paint part of the picture in describing how technology influences other 
function-systems in society. While they depict the operational aspect of how technology 
streamlines sequences of automated actions, they are not sufficient to consider the 
complexity of interactivities in which technology participates. For this, a starting 
framework is required (i.e. a set of theoretical concepts grounded in systems theory), in 
order to reflect on these processes that are not only technologically supported, but also, 
induced and propagated. 
THE SYSTEM OF TECHNOLOGY 
Technology has always been perceived as something ‘distinct from nature’ (Bacon, 
2010). But the relationship between ‘reality’ and how technology can be perceived to 
gain a distinct ontological hypostasis is more subtle. This relationship lies at the core of 
the second order cybernetics tradition with its emphasis in distinction-making. 
Furthermore, by considering second order observing as a method for the deconstruction 
of systems, we can look into how technology operationalises and ‘technicalizes’ other 
domains. Nevertheless, it is the relationship between ‘reality’ and ‘technology’ that 
appears to be the most challenging; and observation is at the centre of both. 
To observe something (anything really), that thing must be distinguished, separated from 
its surroundings, excluded from everything but itself, so that it may be reflected upon. 
This unavoidable and artificial distinction is created by an observer who - in the face of 
complexity - needs to cut down and simplify the world as an unavoidable prerequisite for 
observing. In fact, the function of the observer is to create the distinction between 
observable/unobservable, without which observation would have stood impossible 
(Angell & Demetis, 2010). This has two consequences. Firstly, in performing the 
operations needed for a distinction, by necessity the totality of everything else is not 
observed; the complement of the thing to be observed, is left unobserved. It cannot be 
observed. 
For the system of technology, the imposition of the unity of the distinction between 
automation/non-automation has a similar effect. Through technology, through its 
automated lens of observing, the distinctions that are engulfed must necessarily carve 
reality into automated/non-automated spaces. In effect, the distinction that carves these 
two spaces is a 2nd order simplification of reality. First, an observer identifies a system 
(from whatever reality he/she is observing), and then that system is further reduced on the 
basis of the distinction of automation/non-automation, otherwise the reduction cannot 
enjoy the operative benefits of technology (functioning simplification and closure). 
Through the choices of observers, technology forms another reality, a ‘simplified reality’ 
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in which ‘strict couplings’ are being created between the elements chosen for automation 
and their interrelations. 
However, once the distinction has been made, the totality of that complement constitutes 
a residual category, which is assumed/presumed to be there, but unobserved, and the 
implied paradoxes from the truncated structural couplings are ignored. 
Secondly, by identifying what thing is to be observed, that thing may constitute a 
complex entity in itself and therefore the very process of observing that thing involves 
observing part of its underlying complexity and the sub-things that constitute it. The very 
implications for observation in the latter case imply that the observer has, in observing, to 
oscillate between the thing identified for observation and both its constituent elements 
and the context in which it is sitting. This oscillation is based upon internal differences 
that succumb to the same principle: that the moment something is observed, something 
else is left unobserved. 
Once the initial observation of a scene has been made, the observer has artificially 
isolated the observed system from its environment, but with which the system is 
structurally coupled. The circumstances under which the observer isolates the observed 
system from its environment creates several restrictions: the observed system may also 
act as an observing system itself, thereby observing predetermined aspects of its 
environment, and with which it too has become structurally coupled; at the same time, 
this leaves other elements within that environment unobservable, as a necessity for 
cutting down on the complexity of its own constitution. 
And here lies the dilemma. In order to observe the whole, everything invisible must be 
made visible, but then nothing is distinguished from anything else, from everything else; 
nothing is different, and everything is different. 
As Luhmann puts it: 
“But in order to observe, an observer needs to ‘perform’ operations. Distinctions need to 
be drawn – and by drawing them, respective other sides are excluded, these exclusions 
being not reflected upon during observing. To put it shortly: we are dealing with a 
permanent production of blind spots. In order to see that which a first-order observer does 
not see, a second-order observer is needed who may observe how the first-order observer 
constructs his reality, but who, by doing so, produces blind spots just the same way – and 
so forth” (Luhmann, 2002a). 
Thus, the observer cannot observe his act of observation (as the eye cannot see itself 
seeing). The observer ‘knows’ that he can observe, but ultimately ‘observing’ and 
‘observing that observation’ are quite different. In the former, a distinction is being made; 
in the latter both that distinction, and what it is distinguished from, must be subsumed 
into a new distinction. Such a cognitive inference is a second-order observation. 
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When an observer looks at ‘reality’ (not in the sense of a meaningless gaze), with the 
purpose of ‘extracting information from it’ (in the non-positivist sense), or interacting 
with that reality, then the observer creates a distinction between observed/unobserved. 
The system that is selected to be observed gains an environment as a result of the 
observer’s choice. Of course, the observer’s choice is driven by the unavoidable need to 
reduce the complexity. Complexity in this sense means ‘being forced to select; being 
forced to select means contingency; and contingency means risk’. Then, the observed 
system that is isolated by the observer is structurally coupled with its environment; but 
while some couplings between system/environment are made observable by the choice of 
a framework for observation (chosen by the observer), some others remain invisible (we 
can all those ‘invisible couplings’). This does not mean however that ‘invisible coupling’ 
do not interfere with both system/environment. On the contrary; together they form a 
critical nexus of unobserved interferences. What the observer chooses to 
observe/unobserve or focus/ignore remains contingent upon how the observer changes 
the context of the observation.  
With technology, reality turns into a ‘simplified reality’ where a new observing system 
emerges. The observing capacity of technology is on one hand passed onto the algorithms 
by the 1st order observer-choices being made (e.g. computer architects, designers, 
programmers, etc). On the other hand, algorithms that are adaptive on the basis of user 
feedback can change their algorithmic behaviour in a dynamic. But while the conditions 
with which change will occur are computationally controllable (and hence can be strictly 
defined), their effects can escalate and cause havoc (in a butterfly-effect-like set of 
contingencies). At the micro-level, small effects are normally emergent from the inability 
to get a grip on the sheer complexity of the computing instructions, resulting for example 
in the typical phenomenon of computer bugs, or the gaps that can be exploited to get 
unauthorised access to computer systems. The ensemble of these processes that create 
instabilities (either from within the system itself or from the environment) is of course an 
agglomeration of an incredible number of instructions that form the elements of 
algorithms (in computer coding). The more complex the system of technology becomes, 
the less straightforward it becomes to monitor interactions. The self-reference that 
establishes the systemic character of technology further (i.e. technology controlling 
technology in a non causal sense) sets the scene for even more ‘strict couplings’. At an 
extreme level, human decision-making can be removed altogether. 
A classic example in this context is financial trading. So far, we have been used to scenes 
where ten or more computer screens surround scores of financial analysts, as if ten pairs 
of eyes should be a necessary biological adaptation. But now, trading takes place without 
human intervention at all. It is estimated that algorithmic trading – automated execution 
of orders by machines without human intervention – is used by 60% of US buy-side 
firms. This form of ‘automated execution’ is manifested by the utilization of software and 
their incorporation into the banking industry; and outside of the control of humans, the 
effects of automated transacting can sometimes be surprising. As Hendershott frames it: 
 “…some algorithms are designed to sniff out other algorithms or otherwise identify 
order flow and other information patterns in the data. For example, if an algorithm 
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identifies a sequence of buys in the data and concludes that more buys are coming, an 
algorithmic liquidity supplier might adjust its ask price upward. Information in newswires 
can even be parsed electronically in order to adjust trading algorithms.” (Hendershott, 
Jones, & Menkveld, 2011)  
So at the level of the 2nd order society, escalation into more complex forms of 
communicative structures can give rise to a war between algorithms. As human 
processing and ultimately decision-making relies mostly on the limited capacity of 
humans to process and manipulate information, it becomes unavoidable that the 
asymmetry between the two finds resolution – in some cases – by removing human 
processing and decision-making altogether. These dynamics create an interesting net 
effect: systemic complexity is introduced by technology into other systems in society, 
like the economic system in this particular example. Ultimately, this may destabilize the 
traditional organizational structures that have been institutionally endorsed and centrally 
controlled. The organization of information by algorithmic means, as well as the 
automated execution of orders, implies that the control of organizing becomes part of 
algorithmic processes, and ultimately, human control is given up as a prerequisite to 
automation. Hence we’ve got algorithms that attempt to ‘sniff out other algorithms’, or 
put simply: an algorithmic war, the victims of which can be found in the unintended 
consequences of any complex form of automated organizing.  
Another celebrated example of the systemic implications of technology is the ‘Flash 
Crash of 2:45’ where the Dow Jones Industrial Average had the biggest one-day decline 
in its history, dropping about 9%. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) Chairman, Mary Schapiro during her testimony in US Congress, this was mostly 
due to ‘automated trading systems that follow their coded logic regardless of outcome, 
while human involvement likely would have prevented these orders from executing at 
absurd price’ (Schapiro, 2010).  
This example on the Flash Crash of 2:45, raises another theoretical possibility for the 
code of technology, one that is related to the possibility for human-decision-making at 
different stages of the execution of computer instructions. One such code could be framed 
within the distinction of autonomy/non-autonomy that could still be structurally coupled 
with the code of automation/non-automation. Ultimately, this would imply autonomy in 
the execution of automated orders or human supervision at different stages of automated 
processes (resulting in non-autonomy).  
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the distinction between automation/non-automation, the code of 
technology creates a multiplicity of observable/unobservable spaces. On one hand, 
algorithms express the ‘strict couplings’ of technology; they define a space for causality, 
but within the domain of the ‘simplified reality’ where computational observing becomes 
prevalent. On the other hand, the ‘strict couplings’ that are necessary for technology to 
function, are derailed by the complexity they help create. The predetermined automated 
order of the ‘strict couplings’ helps generate complexity in at least three distinct ways: a) 
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through the emergence of incompatibilities in the domain of the ‘simplified reality’ itself 
(problems in technology or in the interoperability of technologies), b) through the 
interference of technology with other function-systems in society that create 
unpredictable phenomena (technology destabilizing other function-systems like the 
financial system), c) through a disruption of the structural couplings between ‘reality’ and 
‘simplified reality’, where the links between the two become severed as a result of both 
1st order observing and 2nd order observing.  
Within the realm of ‘simplified reality’, automation and causality become predominant, 
and it is through this combination that the power of technology is usually overestimated, 
without accounting for the severe disruption to other function-systems. As the boundary 
between technological utilization and technological interference narrows, the role of 
technology in modern society is becoming more fundamental. Technology penetrates the 
core of an ever-increasing number of application domains. It exerts considerable 
influence over institutions, often in subtle ways that cannot be fully understood, and the 
effects of which, cannot be easily demarcated. More importantly, modern technology 
now exhibits enough systemic characteristics to be considered as a system in its own 
right. A systemic description of technology, informed by second-order cybernetics and 
taking into account the critical effects of technology in communication, will yield better 
and more comprehensive insights into the challenges that lie ahead.   
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